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HAS NORTH CAROLINA REMEDIED THE
PAST PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL ANTI-
PROFIT LEGISLATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, the media frenzy surrounding notorious
individuals has arguably reached higher levels than ever before. In addition,
competition between major broadcast networks has pushed the desire for
exclusive interviews as well as never before seen or heard footage, depictions,
or stories. As a result, the market in which notorious individuals could
potentially exploit their crimes in order to earn a profit has seemingly steadily
expanded. This has presented states with the difficult task of determining
whether criminals should be allowed to profit from their notoriety, and if not,
determining the best way to go about preventing criminals from doing so.
In an effort to not only prevent such notorious individuals from profiting
from their crimes, but also to deter future criminals from engaging in crime
simply to profit, and to provide crime victims with compensation, states have
passed "Son of Sam" laws. 1  However, implicit in their function, by
restricting the ways in which criminals profit from their notoriety, Son of Sam
laws prevent criminals from fully exercising their free speech rights. Thus,
the intended positive effects of such legislation have been largely hampered
by claims that Son of Sam laws violate First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech.2 As a result, Son of Sam laws have been faced with the difficult task
of withstanding strict scrutiny analysis in order to overcome the First
Amendment issues, and have not fared well. 3 Essentially, Son of Sam cases
present an intense battle between a convicted criminal's interest in freedom of
expression and the state's interest in preventing criminals from profiting from
their crimes.
The goal of this Comment is to determine, in light of the turbulent past of
Son of Sam laws, whether North Carolina's recently passed Son of Sam
legislation has improved on defects in the past laws and could withstand a
1. See infra Parts II.A and II.B for a general discussion defining Son of Sam legislation, along
with a discussion of the history and development of Son of Sam laws.
2. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of First Amendment considerations with respect to Son
of Sam legislation.
3. See infra Parts IV.B.I and IV.B.2, regarding Son of Sam laws and strict scrutiny analysis.
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constitutional challenge. Part II presents the background of Son of Sam
legislation, beginning with a brief general discussion of Son of Sam laws,
followed by an in-depth discussion of the history and development of criminal
anti-profit legislation. Part III parses the specific text of North Carolina's
recent Son of Sam legislation, and Part IV considers the viability of North
Carolina's law in light of First Amendment issues and the success (or lack
thereof) of other states' Son of Sam laws.
II. BACKGROUND
A. In General
On August 2, 2004, North Carolina's governor signed a Son of Sam bill
into law,4 making North Carolina one of numerous states that have passed
some sort of criminal anti-profit legislation.5 Traditionally, Son of Sam laws
are those statutes that "require writers, journalists, publishers, or filmmakers
who contract with an accused or convicted person for rights to his 'version' of
the crime to turn any payments over to an escrow fund operated by the
state,,' 6 rather than turning the profits over to the criminal himself. Typically,
if a state decides, after seeing the contractual language, that an accused or
convicted criminal will be paid for telling his story regarding the crime, the
profits made from the story must be paid to the state escrow fund, in order to
be made available for victim or state compensation.7 Essentially, Son of Sam
laws aim to provide adequate compensation for crime victims while at the
same time preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes.
B. History and Development of Son of Sam Laws
The original Son of Sam law was passed in New York in response to a
series of horrific shootings during the summer of 1977 in New York City that
had generated an incredible amount of publicity.8 It was rumored that the
murderer, David Berkowitz, who had referred to himself only as Son of Sam
4. Act of Aug. 2, 2004, ch. 159, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 159.
5. For a listing of other states' current criminal anti-profit statutes, see Jessica Yager,
Investigating New York's 2001 Son of Sam Law: Problems With the Recent Extension of Tort
Liability for People Convicted of Crimes, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 433, 458 n. 119 (2004).
6. JAMES H. STARK & HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS 265
(Norman Dorsen ed., 1985).
7. Id. at 265-66.
8. Id. at 266.
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by notes left at the crime scenes, 9 would be able to collect up to $200,000 if
he were to sell his story. 10 As a result, the New York Legislature quickly
enacted what it termed a Son of Sam law to "prevent Berkowitz from selling
and profiting from his story."'" Senator Emanuel Gold, who authored the
statute, provided justification for the new law: "'It is abhorrent to one's sense
of justice and decency that an individual... can expect to receive large sums
of money for his story once he is captured-while five people are dead, [and]
other people were injured as a result of his conduct."",12 Oddly enough, New
York's Son of Sam law did not apply to Berkowitz, who had been found
incompetent to stand trial, because in its original form, the statute was
applicable only to convicted criminals. 1
3
From its inception, the New York Son of Sam law existed with few
significant challenges, withstanding a constitutional attack on grounds of
vagueness and an attack on the grounds of impairing contracts,' 4 until it was
found unconstitutional in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York
State Crime Victims Board in 1991.15 In Simon & Schuster, Henry Hill, a
well-known gangster who received immunity in return for trading information
about his colleagues, contracted with Nicholas Pileggi, an author, for the
creation of a book about Hill's life. 16 Hill and Pileggi signed an agreement
with Simon & Schuster, Inc. for the book's publication. '7 Eventually, Pileggi
authored Wiseguy, in which Hill spoke candidly about, among other things,
being convicted of extortion.' 8  Within two years, more than one million
copies of Wiseguy had been printed, and the book served as the underlying
9. Kathleen Howe, Note & Comment, Is Free Speech Too High a Price to Pay for Crime?
Overcoming the Constitutional Inconsistencies in Son of Sam Laws, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 341,
344 (2004).
10. STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 266.
11. Howe, supra note 9, at 345. Although New York's Son of Sam law was the first example
of a codified criminal anti-profit law, the concept of preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes is certainly not a recent development. Within a legal, case-specific context, scholars tend to
trace the modem principle back to explicit judicial reasoning from 1889 in the case of Riggs v.
Palmer. Id. at 344 (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)). There, a grandson killed his
grandfather in order to ensure that he would receive his inheritance from his grandfather's will and
avoid the risk that his grandfather would change his will before dying. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189. The
highest appellate court denied the grandson's collection of the inheritance, reasoning, "[no] one shall
be permitted to profit by his own fraud.. . or to acquire property by his own crime." Id. at 190.
12. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
108 (1991) (quoting N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 267 (1977)).
13. Jd. at 111.
14. STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 280 n.49.
15. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115-20.
16. Id. at 112.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 113.
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story for the film Goodfellas. 19
However, shortly after Wiseguy was published, the New York Crime
Victims Board discovered the book and required Simon & Schuster to
produce copies of its contracts with Hill, provide records of payments to Hill,
and withhold any future payments to Hill.20 After further review, the Crime
Victims Board decided that Simon & Schuster's failure to disclose the
contract with Hill, as well as its payments to Hill, had violated New York's
Son of Sam law. 21 The Board required, under the Son of Sam law, that any
money owed to Hill, along with any money already paid to him, had to be
given to the Board for placement into the state's escrow fund.22 As a result,
Simon & Schuster filed suit against the Crime Victims Board claiming that
New York's Son of Sam law violated its First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.23 That is, by placing a financial burden on Hill's speech, the state
was unfairly restricting freedom of expression.
After the district court found the law consistent with the First Amendment
and the court of appeals affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the judgment, finding New York's Son of Sam law to
be in violation of Simon & Schuster's First Amendment rights.24 The Court
held that because the law was a content-based restriction of speech,
discriminating against particular subjects of speech (as opposed to all speech)
by financially burdening those subjects, it was presumed inconsistent with the
First Amendment.2 5  As a result, in order to withstand the constitutional
attack, the state would have to show that the law was "'necessary to serve a
compelling state interest, and... narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' 26 The
Court further concluded that, while New York's Son of Sam law did serve a
compelling state interest, it applied to any works involving even the most
incidental or irrelevant thoughts offered by a criminal about his crime, and
was therefore "significantly overinclusive" for purposes of achieving the
state's interest. 27 Thus, the Court held that the statute was not consistent with
the First Amendment and was invalid.28
19. Id. at 114.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 115.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 115-18. The Court also notes that by penalizing certain expression through content-
based restrictions, a state government in effect may prevent certain viewpoints from being heard in
the marketplace of ideas, directly implicating the First Amendment. See id. at 116.
26. Id. at 118 (quoting Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
27. Id. at 121.
28. Id. at 123.
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In the years since Simon & Schuster, states have not only changed existing
Son of Sam laws but have created new ones in an effort to comply with the
requirement that the laws be narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interest.
29
In its description of legislative responses to Simon & Schuster, the National
Center for Victims of Crime website reports that "[t]he most common change
made to such laws has been expanding them to cover profits received, directly
or indirectly, from crimes, not just profits from speech-related activities. 3 °
As a result of Simon & Schuster, New York amended its law to more
narrowly target only income "generated as a result of having committed the
crime,, 31 placing the emphasis on the criminal's act itself rather than simply
on any passing thoughts about the crime.32 The National Center for Victims
of Crime also reports that certain states have even extended their Son of Sam
laws to include profit gained through notoriety by other people involved in
high-profile cases. 33  The Center uses Georgia legislation as an example:
"Georgia makes it illegal for a 'judge, [prosecuting attorney], investigating
officer, or law enforcement officer who is a witness in a case to receive...
remuneration during the period of time between indictment and the
completion of direct appeal in any criminal case.', 34 While very few states'
Son of Sam statutes have been challenged in court, no Son of Sam law
challenged for constitutionality in relation to the First Amendment has been
able to withstand the attack, despite states' efforts to amend past problematic
legislation and develop new criminal anti-profit laws.35
III. NORTH CAROLINA'S SON OF SAM LAW
As is the case with other jurisdictions, North Carolina's Son of Sam
legislation aims at serving two specific purposes: 1) preventing criminals
from profiting from crimes they have committed and 2) providing crime
victims with better satisfied restitution orders by diverting a criminal's profit
to restitution rather than to the criminal's own pocket.36 In what may be an
attempt to prevent or withstand constitutional attacks on the statute, the North
29. See Howe, supra note 9, at 349-50.
30. NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, NOTORIETY FOR PROFIT/SON OF SAM LEGISLATION,
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentlD=32469 (last visited
Jan. 10, 2006).
31. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(i)(b)(iii) (McKinney 2001).
32. Tracey B. Cobb, Comment, Making a Killing: Evaluating the Constitutionality of the Texas
Son of Sam Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1483, 1495-96 (2003).
33. NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 30.
34. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-98 (2004)).
35. Howe, supra note 9, at 350.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-30(1)-(3) (2004).
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Carolina General Assembly explicitly classifies both of the goals as
"compelling interest[s]" for which it finds the legislation necessary.37 In
doing so, should a court ever choose to defer to North Carolina's legislature in
determining whether the goals of the legislation are compelling, the
legislature has left no doubt as to the importance surrounding the interests
addressed by the law.
Under North Carolina's Son of Sam statute, certain contracts that have the
potential of producing profits for criminals must be reported to the Crime
Victims Compensation Commission (hereafter referred to as "the
Commission").38 Once notified of the contract, the Commission alerts any
victims of the criminal who may be eligible to obtain restitution from the
criminal. 39 Further, if the Commission is not properly notified of a contract
with a criminal, both the criminal and the other party to the contract can be
subject to forfeiture of the contracted amount to the Commission, along with
other civil penalties. 40  The Commission then deposits the funds into an
escrow account and notifies any eligible people with a claim against the
criminal that there are funds available to which they may have a right.4'
Finally, whether collecting profits made from the contract or profits forfeited
and deposited into the escrow fund, eligible persons may bring a civil action
against the criminal offender to collect money for restitution.42
Regardless of the other procedural details of North Carolina's criminal
anti-profit legislation, the crux of any possible First Amendment
constitutional attack against the law would likely be directed at the section of
the statute detailing which potential profit-making contracts must be disclosed
to the Commission and the profits of which made available for victims of
crimes. That particular statutory section addresses not only what type of
profits may be seized, but also specific criteria for what constitutes a criminal
offender. In doing so, that section becomes most vulnerable to incorporating
both overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. 3 According to the statute,
37. § 15B-30(3).
38. § 15B-32(a)(1).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-32(b) (2004). According to the statute, an eligible person can
include: "[a] victim of the crime for which the offender was convicted[,] ... [a] surviving spouse,
parent, or child of a deceased victim of the crime for which the offender was convicted[,] ... [or a]ny
other person dependent for the person's principal support upon a deceased victim." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15B-31(5)(a)-(c) (2004).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-33(a) (2004).
41. § 15B-33(d).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-34(a) (2004).




[e]very person, firm, corporation, partnership,
association, or other legal entity, or representative of [any of
the previously listed], or entity that knowingly contracts for,
pays, or agrees to pay to an offender (i) profit from crime or
(ii) funds of an offender where the value or aggregate value
of the payment or payments exceeds ten thousand dollars
($10,000) shall submit to the Commission a copy of the
contract or reduce to writing the terms of any oral agreement
or obligation to pay as soon as practicable after discovering
the payment or intended payment constitutes profit from
crime or funds of an offender. 4
In addition, the statute broadly defines "profit from crime" as "[a]ny
income, assets, or property obtained through or generated from the
commission of a crime for which the offender was convicted, including any
income ... obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the
commission of, or in preparation for the commission of the crime. 45 In sum,
North Carolina's Son of Sam statute, like other criminal anti-profit legislation,
seeks to obtain from a convicted offender a variety of profits deriving value
from the commission of a crime.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF NORTH CAROLINA'S SON OF SAM
STATUTE
In order to analyze whether North Carolina's Son of Sam statute will
withstand a constitutional attack, it is necessary to not only consider the
common First Amendment issues that tend to arise with respect to Son of Sam
laws, but also to consider how other states' similar criminal anti-profit laws
have fared against claims of First Amendment violations. Taking those two
sub-topics into consideration, it will be possible to compare North Carolina's
legislation to other states' previously challenged legislation in light of the
First Amendment in order to predict the viability of North Carolina's Son of
Sam statute.
A. First Amendment Considerations
As previously explained, the most prominent vulnerability facing a Son of
44. § 15B-32(a)(1).
45. § 15B-31(9). The statute defines "offender" as "[a] person who has been convicted of a
felony or that person's legal representative or assignee." § 15B-31(8).
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Sam law is the constitutionality of the law in regards to a party's First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech. According to the U.S.
Constitution's First Amendment grant of personal rights as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment,46 a State "shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech. 47  Son of Sam laws implicate First
Amendment freedom of speech by placing a financial burden on the speech of
criminals. Essentially, by restricting the profits that criminals can gain from
their speech (as well as the incentive for publishers), states place a financial
burden on speech about a criminal's past crimes. Furthermore, because the
laws specifically burden criminal speech dealing with the crime itself, Son of
Sam legislation is considered content-based. That is, rather than burdening all
speech by criminals, Son of Sam laws have traditionally burdened criminal
speech based on the specific content of the criminal's expression; typically,
the speech is about the crime he or she has committed.
Courts have held that such content-based restrictions are particularly
dangerous to the interests protected by the First Amendment and are therefore
subject to strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny applied to laws accused
of violating constitutional rights. 48 In addition, content-based statutes face a
strong presumption of invalidity. 49 Thus, under strict scrutiny, unless a state
can demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in the legislation and that the
law is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest, the law is
considered constitutionally invalid. 50  As a result, scholars have suggested
that the content-based nature of Son of Sam laws is the foremost hindrance to
their validity. While the United States Supreme Court only implied it in
Simon & Schuster,5 1 in Keenan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,52 a
California Supreme Court justice went so far as to note in his concurrence that
if the criminal anti-profit legislation were content-neutral, not only would a
lower level of judicial scrutiny be applied, but the legislation would likely
survive.53
46. See CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND
RECONSTRUCTION 555-59 (2d ed. 2001) (providing a discussion of incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, and explaining how states, too, are liable for violations of
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
115-16 (1991) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
49. Id. at 115 (citing Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447).
50. Id. at 118 (citing Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
51. See id. at 118-23.
52. Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2002).
53. Id. at 737 (Brown, J., concurring).
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B. Previous Application of Strict Scrutiny to Son of Sam Laws
Since the inception of Son of Sam laws, forty-eight states (including
North Carolina) have, at one point or another, enacted some sort of criminal
anti-profit legislation.54 Seven states have since repealed their legislation.55
Other states' Son of Sam laws have proven to be a useful tool for purposes of
comparison. Despite the relatively high number of states that have enacted
Son of Sam legislation, very few states have had their legislation challenged.
However, while there are only a few court cases specifically addressing the
constitutionality of Son of Sam laws, those cases do provide substantial
insight into the problems plaguing legislation analyzed under strict scrutiny
and possible solutions for future legislation.
1. Compelling State Interest in the Legislation
In order for its Son of Sam law to survive strict scrutiny, a state must first
be able to demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in the objective of the
legislation.56 In Simon & Schuster, the Court acknowledged two different
state interests compelling enough to justify the legislation: 1) victim
compensation 57 and 2) the prevention of criminals from profiting from their
crimes. 58 However, the Court was careful to note that while New York did
have "a compelling interest in compensating victims from the fruits of...
crime," 59 it did not have a compelling "interest in limiting such compensation
to the proceeds of the wrongdoer's speech about crime.",60 That is, in order to
justify specifically limiting victim compensation to profits earned from speech
(as opposed to all profits associated with the crime), a state would have to
54. Yager, supra note 5, at 457. Yager lists New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Vermont as
the three states without Son of Sam laws. Id. However, as of the writing of this article, New
Hampshire and Vermont remain the two states that have yet to have passed any Son of Sam
legislation.
55. Id. at 457-58.
56. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
57. Id. at 118.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 120-21. Although the Court presented this conclusion in its discussion of whether
New York had a compelling interest in legislation, the point seemed better suited to a discussion of
how the statute was tailored. That is, New York's interest lies in compensating victims for the crime,
regardless of how the statute is tailored. It seems as though tapping proceeds from criminals' speech
alone was an underinclusive way of achieving the interest (as will be discussed in subsequent
sections), rather than an aspect of the legislation making it less compelling.
2006]
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present some compelling interest that addressed both the legislation in general
and the limitation to speech.
As a result of Simon & Schuster, California amended its Son of Sam
statute, and the legislature asserted that "[t]he state has a compelling interest
in ensuring that convicted felons do not profit from their crimes and that the
victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them.",6' Consequently,
in Keenan, applying strict scrutiny to California's Son of Sam law, the
California Supreme Court held that the state did indeed "have a compelling
interest in using the fruits of crime" to compensate crime victims. 62 However,
in reasoning similar to the United States Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster,
the California Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the state did not have a
"compelling interest in targeting a criminal's storytelling proceeds in
particular for the purpose of compensating crime victims. ' 63  The court
further clarified that general use of "fruits of crime" including proceeds from
speech (but not limited to those earnings from speech), used for the purpose
of victim compensation was indeed a compelling state interest.
64
In Arizona, the constitutionality of the state's general forfeiture law was
challenged in Arizona v. Gravano.65 While the law specifically applied to
proceeds gained through racketeering-related activities, the general forfeiture
law was similar to Son of Sam laws in that it provided for forfeiture to a state
fund of money and property earned in relation to a crime.6 6 The statute
applied to "all proceeds traceable to an offense included in the definition of
racketeering., 67 "Proceeds" included "any interest in property of any kind
acquired through or caused by an act or omission, or derived from the act or
omission, directly or indirectly, and any fruits of [the] interest, in whatever
form.
' 6 8
Although the court concluded that the statute was content-neutral and
therefore did not have to undergo strict scrutiny, it still considered whether the
state had a compelling interest in the legislation. 69 The court reasoned that
61. Act ofAug. 25, 2000, ch. 261, 2000 Cal. Stat. 261.
62. Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 730 (Cal. 2002).
63. Id. (emphasis in original).
64. Id.
65. Arizona v. Gravano, 60 P.3d 246 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
66. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(D)(7) (2002).
67. § 13-2314(G)(1), (3).
68. § 13-2314(N)(3).
69. Gravano, 60 P.3d at 254. The court admitted that because of its content-neutral nature, the
law would be subject only to intermediate scrutiny and would therefore have to be related only to a
substantial governmental interest. Id. at 253-54. However, the state argued that it had a compelling




not only did the state have a compelling interest in compensating victims of
racketeering, but also that the state had a compelling interest in compensating
out-of-state victims of racketeering harmed by a criminal who had later
moved to Arizona. 70 Additionally, the court found a compelling state interest
in "ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes when the criminal
has relocated to Arizona.
' 71
Furthermore, both the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Bouchard v.
Price,72 and the Nevada Supreme Court in Seres v. Lerner,73 agreed that their
states' Son of Sam laws served a compelling government interest. 74 Relying
on Simon & Schuster, both courts concluded that victim compensation and
prevention of criminals obtaining profits from their crimes were sufficiently
compelling to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.75
Thus, because states generally do not encounter difficulty in showing at
least some compelling interest for their criminal anti-profit legislation, the
focus of the constitutionality of the laws with respect to the First Amendment
shifts to whether the state narrowly drew its statute to achieve the compelling
state interest. 76
2. A Narrowly Tailored Statute
Under strict scrutiny, the more difficult problem facing states has
undoubtedly been ensuring that their criminal anti-profit legislation is
fashioned in such a way that it is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
interests discussed above. That is, the statute must neither be too
overinclusive nor too underinclusive. More commonly, overinclusiveness has
been a sufficient ground for failure of Son of Sam statutes to overcome strict
scrutiny, allowing courts to omit any discussion of possible
underinclusiveness.77
Typically, two problems have arisen in regards to overinclusiveness of
Son of Sam laws. The first problem, as evidenced in Simon & Schuster, is to
70. Id. at 254.
71. Id. The court concluded that "Arizona has a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of
crime are compensated and in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes... even if the
victims do not reside in Arizona and the crimes were committed elsewhere." Id.
72. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670 (R.I. 1997).
73. Seres v. Lerner, 102 P.3d 91 (Nev. 2004).
74. Id. at 97; Bouchard, 694 A.2d at 677.
75. Seres, 102 P.3d at 97; Bouchard, 694 A.2d at 670.
76. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121
(1991); Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 730 (Cal. 2002).
77. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 122; Keenan, 40 P.3d at 731.
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whom the statute applies. New York's statute applied broadly to any "person
convicted of a crime., 78 However, in defining the term "person convicted,"
the statute actually allowed forfeiture of proceeds from anyone accused of a
crime or anyone who voluntarily admitted to the commission of a crime,
regardless of whether that person was eventually convicted. 79 Thus, although
the state had a compelling interest in preventing criminal profiteering from
crimes, the statute was overinclusive in that it applied to, and therefore took
earnings from, potentially innocent people who may have admitted to a crime
which they did not commit. That is, the statute had the ability to strip profits
from people who had not even committed a crime, a result that did not serve
the state's interest of keeping crime profits out of criminals' hands. A
particularly illustrative example of this principle could occur in a recording
artist's lyrics detailing a crime he never committed, but chose to write about
as if he had, simply for artistic purposes critical to the song. Were the state
allowed to prevail under an overinclusive statute, the recording artist would
essentially be stripped of profits from his record, after merely describing a
crime that he had never even committed. Thus, such overinclusive statutes
result in particularly poor public policy.
For purposes of comparison, Alaska's Son of Sam legislation, 80 although
not yet challenged, would likely not be considered narrowly tailored, and
therefore fail to satisfy the second prong of strict scrutiny, because it defines
an offender as a "person who has committed a crime in this state, whether or
not the person has been convicted of the crime., 81 Alaska's statute, like the
original New York statute, is likely overinclusive because it lacks a way of
pinpointing people who have committed crimes but have not been convicted.
Therefore, without a definite process of ensuring that someone who has not
been convicted has actually committed a crime, the statute has the possibility
of mistakenly sweeping in profits from people who the state believes have
committed crimes but who in reality have not. Thus, an action such as this
would not further the state's interest in preventing criminals, specifically,
from profiting from a crime.
The second common problem that arises with respect to overinclusiveness
is to which profits the statute applies. For example, the Simon & Schuster
Court noted that the original New York statute applied to any works,
regardless of the subject, as long as the author in some way recounted the
78. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
79. Sean J. Kealy, A Proposal for a New Massachusetts Notoriety-for-Profit Law: The
Grandson of Sam, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 10 (2000). The Supreme Court discussed this
principle as well in Simon & Schuster. See also Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121.




crime 82 For example, profits made by an author of a cookbook would be
subject to the statute, even if the only reference to the author's criminal act
was a passing sentence on the "Dedication" page of the book. The Simon &
Schuster Court found such a provision to be overinclusive and pointed out the
flaw of a statute that would collect profits from speech that did not even
derive its profitability from notoriety of the author. 83 Thus, although certain
works would not have even allowed an author to profit from his crime, if the
crime was mentioned in any way, the author still would have been stripped of
earnings that did not have a specific link to the crime.
84
Similar to the court in Simon & Schuster, in Keenan, the California
Supreme Court held that the state's Son of Sam statute "penalize[d] the
content of speech to an extent far beyond that necessary to transfer the fruits
of crime from criminals to their uncompensated victims."' 8s California's
legislation provided a remedy for some of the problems found in New York's
Son of Sam statute. g Not only was the law limited in application to people
who had actually been convicted of a felony, but it also provided an exception
for works that included only a "passing mention of the felony, as in a footnote
or bibliography. 87  However, despite the legislature's attempted
improvements, the court held that the law was overinclusive 88 because it still
allowed for confiscation of profits that were not necessarily received as a
result of exploitation of criminal acts:
Mention of one's past felonies in these contexts may have
little or nothing to do with exploiting one's crime for profit,
and thus with the state's interest in compensating crime
victims from the fruits of crime. Yet section 2225(b)(1)
entrusts and permanently confiscates all income, whenever
received, from all expressive materials, whatever their
82. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121.
83. See id. The Court notes that a statute such as New York's original Son of Sam statute
would have wrongly escrowed profits from books such as Malcolm X's autobiography or Thoreau's
famous Civil Disobedience. Id. Although Malcolm X's autobiography most likely gained
profitability from the author's life as a public figure, in the book he recounted crimes he had
committed prior to being a public figure. See id. Thus, according to such legislation as New York's,
his profits would have been subject to a state escrow fund. Id. Similarly, although Thoreau's book
likely gained virtually no profitability from past criminal acts of the author, Thoreau did admit to
refusing to pay taxes in his book, and therefore would have had to turn over profits from his book.
See id.
84. See id. at 122.
85. Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 731 (Cal. 2002).
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b)(1) (West 2000).
87. § 2225(a)(7).
88. Keenan, 40 P.3d at 731-33.
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subject, theme, or commercial appeal, that include a
substantial description of such offenses, whatever their nature
89
Similarly, in Bouchard, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that its Son
of Sam law failed in substantially the same ways as the New York and
California laws by failing to limit the applicability of its law to those
commercial exploitations of crime which were significant rather than merely
incidental. 90 The law applied to all expressions of "events and circumstances
constituting and/or surrounding and/or motivating the crime or alleged
crime. '
In addition to being overinclusive, a statute may also fail to be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest by being too underinclusive. In
Simon & Schuster, without expressly labeling it as such, the Court implied
that a statute that financially burdened only those assets gained from a
criminal's speech rather than assets gained from any commercial exploitation
of the crime, would be underinclusive. 92  As described earlier, the Court
questioned why a state would have any greater interest in seizing assets only
from expressive activity rather than any or all other activities that derive profit
from exploitation of the crime. 93  Such a discussion implies a degree of
underinclusiveness. However, since the Court was already able to invalidate
the statute based on its overinclusiveness, it failed to delve into an explicit
analysis of those parts of the statute that were specifically underinclusive.
94
In Keenan, the California Supreme Court took a similar path, focusing on
the overinclusiveness of the statute, a sufficient ground for failing to
withstand strict scrutiny, and therefore avoiding discussion of
underinclusiveness. 95 However, in his concurrence, Justice Brown addressed
underinclusiveness of Son of Sam statutes and suggested that "a limitation on
the law's scope to storytelling is the Achilles' heel of a Son of Sam
provision." 96 Brown cited Virginia's Son of Sam legislation 97 as an example
of a law that allows a state to seize all profits gained by a criminal through
89. Id. at 732-33.
90. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 676-77 (R.I. 1997).
91. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-3(a) (1983).
92. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
119-20 (1991).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 121-23.
95. Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 731 (Cal. 2002).
96. Id. at 738 (Brown, J., concurring).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (2002).
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exploitation of a crime, regardless of the means pursued by the criminal to
earn money from the exploitation.98 Such a statute resolves the New York
statute's problem of underinclusiveness by not simply seizing profits obtained
through expression. Thus, the statute better serves the compelling interest of
preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes by allowing states to
seize all of a criminal's profits earned through exploitation of the crime.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court articulated these principles in its
explicit discussion of the underinclusiveness of its Son of Sam law in
Bouchard.99 Rhode Island's statute enabled seizure of a criminal's profits
made through commercial exploitation of the crime, defining commercial
exploitation as "any publication, reenactment, dramatization, interview,
depiction, explanation, or expression through any medium of communication
which is undertaken for financial consideration."'' 00 The court noted that no
justification was given for the statute's limitation to expressive activities and
suggested that victim compensation would be better served by "making
available to a victim all the criminal's assets, however and wherever
derived." Thus, the court suggested that by expanding a Son of Sam statute
to include activities other than mere exploitive expression, the legislation
would be less likely to be deemed underinclusive. 1
02
C. How Will North Carolina's Statute Fare Against Constitutional Attacks?
As stated earlier, the most common attack on Son of Sam legislation is
that the law violates a party's First Amendment rights. North Carolina has
had the distinct benefit of being able to see what aspects of other states'
legislation have been problematic in constitutional challenges over the last
few decades. The most logical place to begin analyzing North Carolina's law
is to determine whether the statute is content-based, in order to determine the
type of scrutiny to which the law would be subject in a possible challenge.
Although North Carolina's Son of Sam statute applies to income "generated
from the commission of a crime" including that gained "from the sale of
crime memorabilia or obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained
during the commission"'' 0 3 of a crime, it would still likely be considered
content-based. Inclusive in the statute is a seizure of those profits gained by a
criminal through speech or expression. However, not all expressions by a
98. Keenan, 40 P.3d at 738 (Brown, J., concurring).
99. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 677-78 (R.I. 1997).
100. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2(3) (1983).
101. Bouchard, 694 A.2d at 677.
102. See id.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-31(9) (2005).
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criminal which gain income in any capacity are subject to a financial burden
by the state-only those expressions which generate income "from the
commission of a crime for which the offender was convicted."10 4 Therefore,
since North Carolina's statute includes a burden placed on income derived
from expression about a particular subject, the law is most likely content-
based. As a content-based regulation, the statute faces a strong presumption
of invalidity 0 5 and must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest in order to overcome that burden and be considered constitutional. 106
North Carolina's legislature has explicitly stated compelling state interests
that it hopes the statute will serve.10 7 Included in those state interests are
victim compensation'0 8 and prevention of criminals from profiting from their
crimes,'°9 both of which have been recognized by other courts as compelling
state interests. Although previous courts have criticized a supposed
compelling state interest in preventing criminals from profiting only from
expression about their crime, "0 North Carolina's law would seemingly not be
subject to such criticism because it allows seizure of a criminal's profits from
multiple sources of exploitation."' Thus, since providing some sort of
compelling state interest has generally not been a problem with previously
challenged Son of Sam laws, and because North Carolina would probably not
fall under past criticism posed by courts, North Carolina's Son of Sam law
would likely survive the first prong of strict scrutiny.
Under the second and, in this case, more challenging prong of strict
scrutiny, North Carolina's legislation faces the task of being neither too
overinclusive nor too underinclusive in regards to its method of achieving the
compelling state interest. In regards to the problem of to whom the statute
applies, North Carolina's legislature seems to have remedied the past problem
of New York's overinclusive group of people covered under the law. Unlike
New York's Son of Sam law, North Carolina's law applies narrowly to only
those "person[s] who [have] been convicted of a felony" or the legal
representatives of those persons.12 That is, North Carolina clearly
distinguishes between people who admit to a crime which they have not
104. Id.
105. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
115 (1991) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
106. See id. at 118 (citing Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-30 (2005).
108. § 15B-30(2).
109. § 15B-30(1).
110. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 119-20.




committed, people who are merely accused of a crime but never found guilty,
and people who later admit to a crime for which they were never convicted,
and those offenders who have been convicted of a felony. Thus, by narrowing
the group of people whose profits are eligible for seizure by the state, North
Carolina better ensures that criminals and criminals alone are not allowed to
profit from their crimes, specifically furthering the state's compelling interest.
North Carolina also seems to have remedied the past problems of New
York and Rhode Island's underinclusive legislation. Rather than limiting the
profits eligible for seizure to those gained from exploitive expression about
the crime, North Carolina's Son of Sam law expands the earnings eligible for
escrow to "[a]ny income, assets, or property obtained through or generated
from the commission of a crime for which the offender was convicted."
113
The legislature explicitly includes profits earned from the sale of crime
memorabilia, the sale of knowledge derived from the crime, or any income
derived from the sale of assets or property obtained through the crime. 114
Also, it seems likely that a court could interpret the statute to include not only
memorabilia used during the commission of the crime, but also memorabilia
that gained profitability through the notoriety of the criminal. Thus, North
Carolina's law does not seem to be plagued by the same underinclusive
problems hinted at in Simon & Schuster and described in Bouchard. The
statute again seems to better serve the state's compelling interests by not
being limited to profits gained through speech or expression. Through North
Carolina's legislation, victims will have a broader range of income-bearing
activities from which they will be able to receive compensation.
The one possible weakness of North Carolina's Son of Sam law that other
states' legislation have also suffered from is that it does not provide an
explicit provision exempting income that is not derived from the criminal act
itself. Rather, North Carolina seems to use limiting language, restricting
eligible income to that "obtained through or generated from the commission
of a crime."' 15 That is, instead of including an express provision exempting
income derived by the criminal from something that only mentions the crime
in passing or is only tangentially related to the crime, through the language
used, the legislature seems to make such a provision unnecessary by limiting
profits eligible for seizure to those activities deriving profitability directly
from the commission of the crime. Such language may obviate the need for
an express exemption, provided a court would interpret it in the same manner.
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of circumstances only tangentially related to the act of committing the crime
proves quite difficult for legislatures. Not only have courts given virtually no
insight into ways in which legislatures may better address the problem, but
ultimately, even if a statute does except profits not substantially derived from
the notoriety of the criminal, devising a bright line to distinguish those profits
substantially related versus tangentially related to a crime could be a daunting
task. Thus, although seemingly unlikely, were a court specifically looking for
a vulnerability in the statute, it could find one in this area.
V. CONCLUSION
After nearly three decades of faulty Son of Sam legislation in other states,
North Carolina has made incredible strides towards a law that will be better
able to withstand a constitutional attack. In doing so, North Carolina's
legislation serves as a model for future legislation in other states. At the very
least, North Carolina has improved upon multiple problematic areas of past
legislation.
To begin, North Carolina clearly presents a compelling state interest in the
legislation without limiting the state's interest to income derived from
expression. Further, while the law begins by narrowing its scope to those
persons convicted of a crime in North Carolina, it also expands its scope by
encompassing profits from any sources derived as a result of the commission
of the crime. Thus, the legislature may have remedied past problems
articulated by courts, relating to both overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness. Although the law does not expressly exempt tangential
expression about the crime, the language used seems to make the legislation
applicable only to those profits that directly derive their value from the
commission of the crime. By narrowly tailoring its statute to a compelling
state interest, North Carolina's legislature would have a strong argument in a
constitutional challenge that the interests advanced in the statute outweigh the
party's First Amendment interests and that the statute encompasses only those
factors necessary to achieve the interest. Thus, as a result of its improvements
over past legislation, North Carolina's law stands a strong chance of surviving
strict scrutiny under a First Amendment challenge.
Although Son of Sam laws have been rarely invoked or challenged,
modem trends towards attempting to capitalize on criminal notoriety suggest
increasing probabilities of both. The fact that Son of Sam laws have
consistently failed constitutional attacks in the past suggests that lawmakers
must take remedial efforts to devise the most effective and valid legislation to
serve states' criminal anti-profit interests. Despite some potential weaknesses
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in its Son of Sam law, North Carolina seems to have made significant strides
in developing a Son of Sam law that will be found constitutionally viable.
MELISSA J. MALECKI
* * *
